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IN THE SUPREME COU3T
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

THE STAT-E OF UTAH,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
TERRY D. LOUDEN,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 9851

)
Defendant and Appellant.

)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE K£ND OF CASE

This is a prosecution for burgl a ry in the second
degree.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

The case was tried to a jury .. From a verdict of
guilty and judgment of conviction and sentence, defend ant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Defendant seeks reversal of judgment of conviction and sentence.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
In makino
this statement of facts the numbers in
0
parenthesis refer to the pertinent page numbers of
the record.
At about 6:00p.m. on July 28, 1962 (75) two deputy
sheriffs of Salt Lake County, Utah, acting upon an
"anonymous t:ip" (73,74) went to a motel in Salt Lake
County (74,75) .. They then requested and obtained permission from the motel manager to look around the
motel room occupied by defendant (75). Said deputies
did not have the permission of defendant (or of anyone
who was renting said room) to enter said motel room
(81). The deputies and the motel manager entered
defendant's room, se,arched and found a loaded revolver
in a bureau drawer in the room. After looking around
the room some more they left the roon1 and waited
outside behind a large hedge until defendant and
Roland D. McQueen returned to the motel roo1n at
about 6:30 p.m. (76).

Thereafter the deputies went
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up the stairs to the mote 1 room {76).

One of the

deputies had his gun drawn as they walked up the
stairs (83).

One of the deputies testified that it was

po3sible that the defendant and his companion saw
that deputy {who came up the stairs with his gun drawn)
co me up the stairs {87). After looking in the room
and observing that defendant and his companion were
unarmed, the deputy put the gun back in its holster
and walked into th2 room {83,84) in a very assumptive
manner {86).

When asked whether it would have done

them any good to protest, one of the deputies testified,
"Well, that I don't know." As the deputies were already entering the room they asked if they could come
in and look around {85,89).

The deputies did not ask

to look around till they were in the room {89).

One

of the deputies testified that before they searched,

they received permission to do so from defendant and
his companion {87).

Thereafter the deputiESsearched
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defenda:1t and his companion and then they took the
said gun from the drawer (87). During said search,
the deputies also found a watch in a drawer and some
crow bars in a closet (77). Said deputy sheriff's did
not have a search warrant for any of the foregoing
·searches (82,83,88). Nor is there any evidence that
they had an arrest warrant or that any crime was
committed in their presence.
Said gun was introduced and received in evidence
as

exhi~it

S-1.

The watch taken from the drawer

(same drawer as gun) was introduced and received as
evidence as exhibit S-2 {77,97). As a result of the
said search another watch was taken from defendant's
person (77) and admitted in evidence as exhibit S-Z
(97) and as the result of said search an:l of said confession (79) a camera was obtained (80) and received
in evidence' as exhibit S-4 (97).

The testimony tended

to show that the serial number on said gun (76) was

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-5-

the same as the serial number on a box which had
contained a gun allegedly stolen from Harmon City
Shopping Center {64,65).
Defendant moved to suppress as evidence the
fruit of the foregoing search {6,8,68,71,72)but the
court denied the motions (68, 71, 72).

Defendant also

made a motion at the trial that the court itself hear
evidence on the issue of the illegal search and seizure
and determine that question, before evidence thereon
was presented to the jury (69), but the court refused
to follow that procedure, and allowed the evidence to
mitiell;'"- go to the jury {70). Defendant also objected
to the admission of testimony regarding said search
and seizure {75).
After defendant and his companion had been
searched {together with the room), defendant was taken
to the Salt Lake County jail (78) where he was allegedly
held on another charge (92,93).

One of the deputies
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testified that two days later at the jail he had a conversation with defendant (78,92), and that during this
conversation, which was a general conversation in
which the deputy intended to get a confession (92),
defendant allegedly made a confession (79,80), and
thereafter in the same conversation the deputy told
defendant that if he would clear up some other offenses
of which he was suspected, that said deputy would not
sign a complaint against him on those n1atters (90,
95). On August 2, 1962, three days later, the dep~ty
sig ned a complaint against defendant for burglary
before a judge of Salt Lake City (5) and a warrant of
arrest was issued the same day, August 2, 1962, and
defendant was arrested by virtue of said warrant
on August 2, 1962 (4).
At the trial, defendant objected to th·2 admission
of evidence on the aforesaid alleged confession (67,

69). Defendant contended that the confession was
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-7induced by a promise of leniency (69) and that the
court should hear and determine whether evidence
of the alleged confession was admissable (69).
Defendant's attorney stated his intention to call
the defendant as a witness in the hearing before the
court on the confession issue (68).

The court however

refused to hear and rule on the admissibility of the
confession before letting the jury hear it (71, 72).
At the trial a verdict of guilty was returned
against defendant (37) and defendant was ordered confined in the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate
term as provided by law for Burglary in the Second
Degree ( 44).

ARGUMENT
POINT 1

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
HEAR EVIDENCE ON THE ISSUE OF THE COMPETENCY OF DEFENDANT'S ALLEGED CONFE.SSION
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AND RULING THEREON BEFORE PERMITTING
EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGED CONFESSION TO
BE PRESENTED TO THE JUHY.
The majority opinion written by Justice Wade in
the case of Sate v. Crank, 105 Utah 332, 142 F. 2d
178 (1943) announced the rule applicable to alleged involuntary confessions. In that case the court held at
page 373:
"We agree with the rule approved in those
cases, that a confession is not admissible in
evidence unless it was voluntarily made; that
this question must be determined by the court
from all of the evidence from both sides bearing thereon; that if the court is satisfied from
the evidence that the confession was voluntary,
then the court admits the confession in evidence
to the jury, together with all of the evidence on
the question of whether it was voluntary, and the
circumstances surrounding its being made, and
froJ.n such evidence the jury must determine the
weight and credibility to be given it, but may not
determine its competency as evid en:::: e, that being
a question for the court."
This has been the rule follo\ved by the Su"()ren1e
Court of Utah ever since. See State v. Ashdown,
5 Uiah 2d 59, 269 F. 2d 726 (1956), State v. Braasch
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119 Utah 450, 229 P. 2d 289 {1951), State v. Mares
113 Utah 225, 192 P. 2d 861 {1948), and State v. Fraser,
107 Utah 454, 154 P. 2d 752 { 1944). The same rule
applies whether the volintariness of a confession
comes in issue by virtue of abusive treatment or by
virtue of a promise of leniency. See State v. Ashdown,
supra.
The reasons for the rule are set forth in the Utah
cases deciding and dealing with it, and the rule is
clearly a good one. One observation should be made
here, however. In State v. Ashdown, supra, the court
appears to have approved the rule allowing the defendant, in the 'hearing before the court {in the absence of
the jury) on the issue of the competency of a confession,
to take the stand for the sole purpose of testifying as
to that issue. See page 64 of that decision. The view
that a defendant does not waive the privilege

against

self incrimination by taking the stand on the issue of
an alleged involuntary confession only is supported
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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by the following cases: State v. Thomas, 208 La

548, 23 So. 2d 212 {1945) Enoch v. Comm. 141 Va 411,
126 SE 222 (1925) and Hawkins v. State 193 Miss 586,
10 So 2d 678 (1942). See also 147 ALR 255 at page
272. This is a good rule, and one which goes a long
way in deterring unlawful interrogation procedures.
In this case, although the volintariness of the
alleged confession was properly raised by defendant
at the trial, and although defendant's attorney proposed to call defendant as a witness in the issue of
the competancy of the alleged confession as evidence
the court refused to hear and rule on the issue, but
rather allowed it to go directly to the jury.
This procedure materially predjudiced defendant,
because it precluded the defendant from testifying
on the issue of co1npetancy. Had the court itself
heard his testimony, as it should have, it might well
have ruled the entire confession incompetent. Therefore it cannot be said that since the evidence presented
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to the jury showed the confession to have been colnpetant that the court merely committed a technical
error which did not prejudice the defendant.

The jury

didn't hear all of the evidence.
Although the deputy testified that defendant confessed to the burglary before any promise of leniency
was made, he did testify that the conversation was a
general one and the record indicates some uncertainty
even in his mind as to the order in which statements
were made. The defendant should have been given an
opportunity to present his testimony on that issue without waiving his privilege against self incrimination
and before the confession was given to the jury.
Failure to allow him to do so, and the admission in
evidence of the confession and exhibit S-4, obtained
as a result thereof, constitutes prejudicial error.
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THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE OBTAINED PUHSUANT TO AN UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEiZURE AN.D IN REFUSING TO
SUSTAIN DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO THE ADMISSION OF SUCH IN EVIDENCE.
The question of the admissability in a trial of
evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful search
and seizure has been a subject of controversy for
many years.

The prohibition against ''unreasonable

searches and seizures'' contained in the Constitution
of the United States, Amendment IV, and. in the Constitution of Utah, Art. I, Section 14, is clear. What
has not been so clear is what to do with evidence
obtained in violation thereof.

Much has been said

on both sides. The Supreme Court of the United
States announced the rule, that such evidence is
inadmissible in federal courts, in the case of Weeks
v. United States, 232

US 383, 58 Led 652, 34 S Ct

341, LRA 1915 B 834, Ann Cas 1915 C 1177 (1914).
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-13This rule of exclusion has received ever expanding
application since then.

Until 1961 the states were

free to adopt or reject the exclusion rule in state
court prosecutions for state crimes.

This rule was

formally announced in the' case of Wolf v. Colorado,
338 US 25, 93 Led 1782, 69 S Ct 1359 (1949) which
held that Amendment XIVof the Constitution of the
United States did not forbid the admission of evidence
obtained by unreasonable search and seizure in state
court prosecutions for state crimes.
Prior to 1961 the Supreme Court of Utah alo-;.1g with
anum her of other states had r·ej ected the exclusion
rule. State v. Aim e 62 Utah 476, 220 P. 704 (1923)
and State v. Fair 10 Utah 2d 365, 353 P. 2d 615(1960).
In 1961 the Supreme Court of the United States
in the case of Mapp v. Ohio, 137 US 643, 6 Led 2d
1081, 81 S Ct 1684 {1961) overruled the case of Wolf
v. Colorado, supra, and held on constitutional
grounds, and not just as a rule of evidence, that:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-14-

''We hold that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the
Constitution is by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court."
The court holds that the exclusion rule of Weeks
v. United

Sta~es,

supra, to be "an essential part of

both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments".

The

court further said:
"Since the Fourth Amendment's right of
privacy has been declared enforceable against
the State through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the,
same sanction of exclusion as is used against the
Federal Government."
Thus the decision of Mapp v. Ohio has the effect
of overruling the Utah cases of State v. Aime, supra,
and State v. Fair, supra, and establishing in Utah the
federal exclusion rule, the "same sanction of exclusion
as is used against the Fed era 1 Gave rn1nent" Map"? v.
Ohio, supra.
Thus this court must consider the issue of unl 8 \vful sea:rch and seizure in the light of the exclusion
rules which exist in the federal courts as a minin1 un1
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sta-,1d a rd.•_ This court. can of c ours

be as

t r ict or

-15lenient as it deems proper in interpreting our
state constitutional prohibition against "unreasonable searches and seizures" so long as it does not
fall below the federal minimum standard.
Defendant contends that evidence obtained as a
'

result of an unlawful search and seizure, in violation
of both state and federal Constitutions, was received
in evidence against him and that prej udi<ial error
was thereby committed.
The deputies admitted that when they first
entered the motel room they had no permission from
defendant or anyone who was renting the room. The
entry was a trespass and the search obviously unreasonable and unlawful.
The question remains, however, as to whether this
unlawful search taints the second search which took
pla-:e about thirty minutes later when defendant was
in his room. The a·:1swer is that it does -- both on
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principle and federal decision.
The case of Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States 251 US 385, 64 L ed 319, 40 S Ct 182, 24 ALR
1426 (1920) is a case where federal officials without
authority unlawfully seized certain books and other
papers. Based on information thus obtained a new
indictment was framed.

The items were returned

after copies had been ma::le and subpoenas issued to
pro::luce the originals.

Plaintiff's in error refused,

the court ordered compliance which was still refused.
Contempt was adjudged and plaintiffs in error appealed
The Supreme Court there held in an opinion by Justice
Holmes, that to allow such a use of illegally obtained
evidence "reduces the 4th Amen::lm ent to a form of
words". The court further held:
''The essence of a pro vis ion forbidding the
acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that
not merely evidence so acquired shall not be
used before the court, but that it shall not be
used at all. Of course this does not mean that
the facts thus obtained become sacred and
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and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is
gained from an independent source they may
be proved like any others,. but the knowledge
gained by the government's own wrong cannot
be used by it in the way proposed."
Mapp v. Ohio, supra, cites with approval, at
least three times, Silverthorne Lum her Co. v.
United States, supra. It is thus clearly the present
law on the question and is controlling in this cas~.
In the Silverthorne Case, supra, it was held that
after an illegal search and seizure the government
couldn't thereafter get the books and papers by lawful means {subpoena). Thus in the instant case, even
if the deputies had returned with a proper search

warrant, after their illegal search, they could not
have seized the items of which they obtained knowledge during the unlawful search.
Under the Silverthorne case, supra, whatever
facts were gained by the illegal search are not
"sac red and inaccessible''. but they can be proved
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only

g

knowledge of them is gained from an "in-

dependent source". To hold otherwise would open
the door to peace officers searching in secret, just
like a burglar, but without taking the hazards of a
burglar, because done without the interference of
other peace officers.

Then having found something

incriminating as the result of such a "fishing expeditio>"l" return with a search warrant to make the
whole thing legal. Past experience has shown that
the possibility of an independent action for dam ages
against a peace officer for such a trespass is not
effective as a deterrent. If con vic ted, how is a defendant to finance such legal action from the peniten··
tiary when he does not have funds to hire counsel to
represent him in the criminal proceedings and must
have counsel appointed for him by the court, as in
this case.
It cannot be said that the gun and other iten1 s
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-19·were obtained from an "independent source". The
second search was really just an extension of the
first. Even assuming defendant gave the deputies
per!"!lission to look around, it was given without
knowledge of the illegal search. Had defendant
been informed of the illegal search and that as a
result the deputies could not get a search warrant
(under the Silverthorne case, supra) defendant undoubted ly would not have allowed the search. Defendant cannot be said to have waived his rights
arising from the illegal search and seizure without
having been informed thereof. There can be no
waiver without knowledge.
The foregoing arguments are particularly true
in the light of the attitude of the deputies.

They were

"assumptive'' and just walked into the room askino0
permission on their way, and this after having just
had a gun drawn which defendant might have seen
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according to the testimo:1y.

These facts alone

should render the entire search and seizure
illegal as constituting an implied coercion and thus
rendering invalid any "consent" by the defendant.
There is no waiver of an illegal search and seizure
made under an implied coercion and the Supreme
Court of the United States has so held, Amos v.
United States 255 US 313, 41 S Ct 266, 65 L ed 654
(1921).
The admission in evidence of exhibits S-1,
S-2, S-3 and S-4 and of testimony regarding the
illegal search and seizure constitutes prejudicial
error.
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POINT 3

tZ/

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSll~G TO HE 11EVIDENCE
AND R
ON THE ISSUE OF THE CONPETENCY AND
r1ISSIBILITY
OF EVI NCE OF AN ALLEGED UNLA\~UL SEARCH
SEIZURE
BEFORE
HTTING EVillENCE, ALlEGEDLY OBT NED AS THE
RESULT T. REOF, TO BE PRESENTED TO THE J Y.

issue of an illegal sear

was raised by

and seizure

defendanj{f~~~l't ~ should have

heard

.ei/

e absence of the jury
competency thereof.
Dafendant should have

ol /"CG

.

een B rmi tted to

testi~J

on

I

this issue/without waiv · g his priviledge against self
incrimination.

search and sei~ure, then the evi

nee should have been

pre sen ted to t

Height and cr dibili ty to be given to

t.

This

situation invoi ing a confession
So long as this
the e elusion rule, the question of how to tre t such
Now that we have

a, the court should clearly announce the rule
follol-ted in these situations, and upon principal
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,

matter should be
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In cases such as the instant case, ':i!ero an issue

of unlaHful search and seizure and of involuntary confession arise, the court could hear the evidence on both
at the same time and in the absence of the jur,y.
3

.if

POINT

THE TRIAL COD"RT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE TO TH&
JE)Y DEFENDANT•S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS.

As stated in Startin v •.11adsen, 120 Utah 631,
237 P. 2d 834 (1951) the court has the duty n to
cover the theories of both parties in his instruc·tions. 11

In this case the essence of defendant's requested
instructions) to 7 was a request for a specific instruction
on the confession issue.

Although the. request

may

have

been technicallY excessive in the light of State v.
Ashdown, supra, and State v. Braasch, supra, nevertheless, the court, in accordance with too spirit
of the requests,shotud have given a specific instruction
on the issue of the confession in tenns like or similar
to those contained in the instruction approved by this
court in State v.

Ashdot~,

supra, at pages 66 and 67
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The failure to give such an instruction constitutes
prejudicial error.

CONCLUSION
Prejudical error was committed in the trial of
defendant as herein set out, and the judgment and sentence
of the trial court should be reversed.

RespectfullY submitted,
Robert c. Ctmmdngs
705 utah Savings Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Defendant and
Appellant
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